IT/OT convergence risks represent one of the most critical and rapidly evolving governance challenges facing boards of directors—especially in energy, utilities, manufacturing, transportation, and critical infrastructure sectors. As industrial operations increasingly integrate with enterprise IT systems (for efficiency, data analytics, and remote management), the attack surface expands, and traditional IT security models often fail to protect fragile, legacy OT environments.
Below is a board-level overview of key risks, governance implications, and strategic questions directors should be asking.
🔌 What Is IT/OT Convergence?
- IT (Information Technology): Business systems (ERP, email, cloud apps)—focused on data confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
- OT (Operational Technology): Industrial control systems (ICS) like SCADA, DCS, PLCs that manage physical processes (e.g., power grids, water treatment, factory lines)—focused on safety, reliability, and real-time performance.
- Convergence: Connecting OT networks to IT networks (e.g., for predictive maintenance, centralized monitoring, or cloud-based analytics).
⚠️ The problem: OT systems were never designed for internet connectivity or modern cyber threats. A single misconfigured bridge can turn a phishing email into a plant shutdown.
🚨 Top IT/OT Convergence Risks (Board-Relevant)
| Risk | Impact | Real-World Example |
|---|---|---|
| Lateral Movement from IT to OT | Ransomware or APTs (e.g., TRITON, Colonial Pipeline) spread from corporate IT into safety systems | 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack: IT breach led to OT shutdown, fuel shortages, $4.4M ransom |
| Insecure Remote Access | Third-party vendors or engineers use unsecured PAM solutions to access PLCs/SCADA | 2014 German steel mill: Attackers disrupted furnace controls via phishing → physical damage |
| Legacy OT Systems with No Patching | Unpatched Windows XP PLCs, default credentials, no logging | U.S. CISA Alert: >50% of ICS vulnerabilities exploited are >2 years old |
| Cloud Integration Without Guardrails | OT data sent to cloud analytics platforms without air-gapped validation | Misconfigured AWS IoT Greengrass can expose Modbus/TCP streams |
| Privileged Access Abuse | Overprivileged service accounts or shared credentials in CyberArk vaults with weak session isolation | Internal threat or credential theft → unauthorized setpoint changes |
🛡️ Governance Implications for Boards
- Risk Oversight Gap:
Most audit/risk committees understand IT cyber risk—but few grasp OT-specific threats (e.g., process safety compromise, physical sabotage, supply chain disruption). - Regulatory Exposure:
Increasing mandates (e.g., NIS2 (EU), NERC CIP (North America), CISA’s OT Cybersecurity Performance Goals) require board-level accountability for ICS resilience. - Third-Party Risk:
60%+ of OT breaches originate via vendors. Are vendor access controls (e.g., CyberArk PSM for ICS, jump servers, session recording) reviewed at the board level? - Insurance & Liability:
Cyber insurers now ask specific OT questions. A gap in ICS coverage could void policies after an incident.
❓Critical Board Questions to Ask Management
✅ “Do we have an accurate, real-time inventory of all OT assets—including those managed by third parties?”
(Most companies don’t—discovery scanning in OT is complex due to protocol sensitivity.)
✅ “How is privileged access to critical OT systems (e.g., HMI, engineering workstations) governed and monitored?”
(Look for session isolation, command filtering, and break-glass accountability—not just password vaulting.)
✅ “Is our incident response plan tested for scenarios where IT and OT are simultaneously compromised?”
(Many IR plans assume IT-only breaches.)
✅ “Who owns IT/OT convergence risk—the CISO, CIO, COO, or a cross-functional team? Is this reported to the board?”
✅ “Are we applying Zero Trust principles to OT, or just assuming ‘air gaps’ still exist?”
(True air gaps are rare; most are “vapor gaps.”)
🔧 Strategic Mitigations Boards Should Champion
- Dedicated OT Cyber Function: Separate from IT security, with engineers who understand Modbus, DNP3, and OPC-UA.
- Network Segmentation: Unidirectional gateways (data diodes), microsegmentation, protocol-aware firewalls.
- Privileged Access Management for OT:
- Custom PSM connectors that proxy sessions without agent installation
- Session recording with replay for forensic review
- AutoIT/Shell-based plugins that validate commands before execution
- Board-Level Dashboards: Not technical logs—risk indicators like:
- % of critical OT assets with unpatched CVEs
- Mean time to detect lateral movement into OT
- Third-party access review compliance rate
